State crackdowns on political opposition are hardly new in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Türkiye. Since coming to power in 2003 as Prime Minister, and later assuming the presidency under a revised Constitution, Mr. Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have shown little tolerance for dissent. His government has systematically targeted political opponents, journalists, activists and critics. Yet, even by Türkiye’s troubled democratic standards, the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu marks a troubling escalation. He was detained on March 19, 2025 on charges of corruption and alleged ties to terrorism — accusations largely stemming from his association with pro-Kurdish political groups. His arrest came just days before he was expected to be officially named the presidential candidate of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). On March 23, an Istanbul court ordered his formal arrest, and he was swiftly removed from office by the Interior Ministry. He is the fifth CHP mayor to be dismissed by the government in recent months.

The move has sparked massive protests. In a show of public defiance, the CHP held a primary open to the general electorate — not just party members — in which it claimed the participation of 15 million voters, choosing Mr. İmamoğlu as their presidential nominee. Mr. Erdoğan has dismissed the protests, but the motive behind this orchestrated campaign is clear. With his presidential term set to end in 2028, he is constitutionally barred from running again — unless early elections are called, or the Constitution is amended. But Parliament may trigger snap elections, paving the way for his seeking another term, particularly as he lacks a clear successor within the AKP. Mr. İmamoğlu, meanwhile, has emerged as the most potent opposition figure in years. Since winning the Istanbul mayoralty in 2019, he has helped revive the CHP’s national prospects. In last year’s local elections, the party secured its strongest result since the 1970s, even outpolling the AKP nationwide. While Mr. Erdoğan’s popularity has declined amid rampant inflation, economic stagnation, and a plunging lira — eroding the appeal of his once-successful blend of Islamic conservatism and pro-business policies — Mr. İmamoğlu, a self-proclaimed social democrat, has offered a progressive alternative that is focused on expanded social services and inclusive growth. The massive voter turnout in the CHP primary and the scale of the protests underscore his enduring appeal. If he is barred from contesting future elections, Mr. Erdoğan may eliminate his most formidable rival, but at the cost of deepening political divisions and further eroding public faith in democratic institutions. At 71, Mr. Erdoğan would do well to heed the voices in the streets, abandon the persecution of political challengers, and focus on addressing the economic crisis that his policies have helped create. Türkiye’s future hinges not just on who governs, but on whether its democracy can still offer a fair and open contest for power.